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attitudes are shared with others is related to attitude certainty 
(Holtz 2003). As such, in order to feel epistemically secure 
regarding their own beliefs, people can follow the norms of 
the group (Fu et al. 2007). However, epistemic security goals 
can be attained through different paths (Roets 2017). In the 
present research, we examine the possibility that epistemic 
security can also be achieved by projecting one’s beliefs on 
the group. That is, are people high in need for epistemic 
security (i.e., need for cognitive closure), more inclined to 
assume that the (in-)group shares their beliefs, as such lend-
ing subjective validation and affirmation to their beliefs?
Need for closure
In contemporary psychological research, the need for epis-
temic security is commonly operationalized with the Need 
for Cognitive Closure (NFC) construct. The NFC was orig-
inally introduced by Kruglanski (1980) and is defined as 
the “desire for an answer on a given topic, any answer … 
compared to confusion and ambiguity” (Kruglanski 1990, 
p. 337). This desire to reach and maintain epistemic clo-
sure varies along a motivational continuum, ranging from a 
strong need to avoid closure to a high need to obtain closure, 
depending on the perceived ratio of costs and benefits of 
lacking closure. Elevated levels of NFC instill two general, 
entwined tendencies. The urgency tendency denotes the 
pursuit of quick and firm answers by ‘seizing’ rapidly on 
information that provides closure. The permanence tendency 
elicits ‘freezing’ on acquired knowledge in order to maintain 
the obtained closure (Kruglanski and Webster 1996). Situ-
ational determinants such as time pressure, noise or fatigue 
can temporarily enhance the NFC (Kruglanski and Webster 
1996), but importantly, people also show reliable differences 
in their dispositional level of NFC, which are capture with 
Abstract The need for closure (NFC) promotes group-cen-
trism, referring to the pursuit of a shared reality in a group, 
commonly achieved through conformity to and introjection 
of group norms. The present study expands this perspective 
by examining how NFC motivates projection of one’s own 
norms on groups, as an alternative means to achieve epis-
temic security in the absence of clear group norms. In Study 
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for the generic effect of NFC on social projection. In line 
with the assertion that the epistemic value of a collectivity 
is a function of the degree to which the collectivity matters 
for the individual, Study 2 (N = 239) and Study 3 (N = 223) 
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ened for in-groups and disappeared for out-groups. Further-
more, mediation analyses demonstrated that essentialist 
entitativity beliefs mediate the relationship between NFC 
and in-group projection.
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Introduction
Festinger (1950, p. 272) already stated that ‘an opinion, a 
belief, an attitude is “correct”, “valid”, and “proper” to the 
extent that it is anchored in a group of people with similar 
beliefs, opinions and attitudes’. Indeed, the belief that one’s 
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the NFC scale (Webster and Kruglanski 1994; revised by; 
Roets and Van Hiel 2007). The NFC scale consists of five 
facets, capturing the various characteristics of high need for 
epistemic security: Individuals high in NFC have a (1) pref-
erence for order and structure in their lives, abhorring chaos 
and disorder. They also (2) prefer predictability, as reflected 
in a desire for secure and stable knowledge that is reliable 
across circumstances. Additionally, high NFC individuals 
strive for quick and steady decisions, reflected in their (3) 
need for decisiveness, and (4) they experience situations that 
devoid of closure as aversive, or feel discomfort with ambi-
guity. Finally, they are (5) closed-minded, reflected by the 
reluctance to have their knowledge challenged (see Webster 
and Kruglanski 1994; Roets and Van Hiel 2007, 2011a).
Need for closure and conformity
Although the NFC was originally introduced in the domain 
of lay epistemics, the various research programs on NFC that 
have followed, have deepened our insight in many domains 
of social sciences (for a recent comprehensive overview, see 
Roets et al. 2015), including insights in the field of group 
processes. According to Kruglanski et al. (2006), the NFC 
promotes a ‘syndrome’ of group-centrism, referring to the 
pursuit of a shared reality and common world view within 
a group and among its members. Indeed, as Kruglanski 
et al. (2006) argued, a group can be a powerful “Epistemic 
Provider” if the reality that it presents to its members is 
grounded in opinion uniformity and group consensus. An 
important way to facilitate this experience of shared real-
ity is conformity and especially the introjection of group 
norms. Many studies, conducted in both experimental and 
natural settings, have provided evidence for the role of NFC 
in adopting group norms and attitudes. For example, dispo-
sitional levels of NFC are strongly associated with valuing 
conformity, as measured with the Schwartz Value Survey 
(Calogero et al. 2009). More direct evidence for the impact 
of NFC on the adoption of group norms was provided by 
Fu et al. (2007), who demonstrated in a series of studies 
that individuals higher (vs. lower) in NFC are more inclined 
to align their conflict styles, procedural preferences, infor-
mation gathering styles during disputes, and fairness judg-
ments to the norms of their culture. Furthermore, Livi et al. 
(2015) recently provided evidence for the role of NFC in 
the transgenerational norm transmission by demonstrating 
that NFC, whether it was situationally induced or varied 
via group composition, strengthened the consolidation and 
transmission of group norms across generations of a labo-
ratory microculture. Notably, individuals high in NFC do 
not only conform to group norms, but also put pressure on 
other individuals to conform (De Grada et al. 1999), and 
reject those individuals whose beliefs are not in line with 
the group (Kruglanski and Webster 1991). In sum, there is 
a bulk of evidence indicating that individuals high in NFC 
adopt group norms in order to attain a shared reality with 
in-group members (for a more elaborate overview, see Krug-
lanski et al. 2006; Roets et al. 2015).
Need for closure and social projection
Introjecting the norms and attitudes of the group is a logical 
and straightforward way to attain a shared reality with the 
group and the epistemic security that comes with it. How-
ever, what if the individual has no knowledge or means to 
gain knowledge about what the group norms and attitudes 
are on a particular topic? Such situations obviously would 
create a state of uncertainty, which is most aversive to peo-
ple high in NFC. Indeed, as stated by Hardin and Higgins 
(1996), individual experiences are in the absence of social 
verification random and ephemeral. Only once they are rec-
ognized and shared by others these subjective experiences 
achieve the phenomenological status of objective reality, and 
as a consequence become valid and reliable. Hence, if there 
is no shared reality, there is no epistemic security.
A straightforward solution to this impediment could be 
for the individual to just presume that the group’s attitudes 
and norms are similar to one’s own. In other words, the indi-
vidual may project his or her own beliefs onto the group to 
fill the epistemic vacuum and contrive an (unsubstantiated) 
sense of shared reality and epistemic security by the group.
Decades of research provides a bulk of evidence for the 
existence of the phenomenon wherein individuals tend to 
perceive consensus between their own attitudes and those 
of the group (see Robbins and Krueger 2005 for a meta-ana-
lytic integration of these studies). Various (complementary) 
mechanisms have been proposed to underlie this phenom-
enon (Krueger 1998), including, but not limited to, enhanced 
availability of the own preferences (Tversky and Kahneman 
1973), selective exposure towards similar others (e.g. Ross 
et al. 1977) and ego enhancement (e.g. Holmes 1968).
Remarkably however, to the best of our knowledge, the 
phenomenon of social projection has not yet been considered 
in terms of its functionality in providing epistemic security, 
by acting as “ersatz” for a shared social reality. Based on 
the extensive literature on NFC (see Kruglanski and Web-
ster 1996) and recent theorizing about the diverse means 
through which the goal of epistemic security and closure 
can be achieved (Roets 2017), we advance that individuals 
high in NFC will be more inclined to employ social projec-
tion, exactly because it provides a surrogate for the epistemic 
security properties of a shared social reality in situations that 
are devoid of an explicit group opinion.
Moreover, extrapolating opinions of the individual to the 
group and vice versa should come more naturally to people 
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high in NFC, because they have stronger beliefs about group 
entitativity and a more essentialist view on social groups, 
as demonstrated in correlational as well as experimental 
research (Roets and Van Hiel 2011b). Indeed, “the degree 
of shared reality in a social collectivity defines its degree of 
groupness or entitativity” (Kruglanski et al. 2006, p. 88; see 
also e.g.; Campbell 1958). Hence, for high NFC individuals 
to rely on groups as epistemic providers, essentialist thinking 
is necessary and inevitable. Importantly, a belief in essential-
ist entitativity does not only mean that group membership 
has high informational value for its members, but also that 
an individual member is fairly representative of the group 
as a whole, which allows to extrapolate the attitude of one 
member (e.g., oneself) to the attitude of the group.
In-group versus out-group as epistemic provider
Of course, not just any group provides epistemic security 
to the individual: The epistemic value of a collectivity is a 
function of the extent to which the collectivity matters for 
the individual (Kruglanski et al. 2006). As such, an inci-
dental crowd has less epistemic value than a meaningful 
in-group with which one identifies, and groups that are seen 
as out-groups should have very little or no value as epistemic 
security providers for the individual. Consequentially, these 
group-type differences should also translate into the degree 
of social projection as a means to achieve epistemic security. 
That is, NFC effects on social projection can be expected to 
be largest for in-groups, smaller for an incidental, unspeci-
fied groups, and minimal for explicit out-groups.
The present research
To test our predictions about the role of NFC in the occur-
rence of social projection, we conducted three studies. First, 
we test for a general effect of NFC on social projection on an 
‘incidental group’, without further specifications that charac-
terize the group as an in- or out-group. Next, in Study 2, we 
introduce a modest group differentiation, investigating social 
projection on the in-group (students in the same curricu-
lum) versus out-group (students in a different curriculum). 
Finally, in Study 3, we investigate social projection with a 
strong in-group out-group differentiation; i.e., Clinton-voters 
versus Trump-voters. In each study we assessed the impact 
of NFC on social projection, and in Study 2 and 3, we addi-
tionally tested whether essentialist entitativity thinking plays 
a mediating role in the effects.
Importantly, for each study, we used a set of ‘neutral’ 
stimuli in order to create a situation devoid of group norms. 
Previous studies have often examined social projection on 
topics that are influenced by group norms (e.g. civil issues, 
see Holtz 2003) or asked participants about perceived group 
attitudes before asking to describe their own attitudes, which 
rather taps into conformity (cf. Krueger 1998). In the present 
studies, we explicitly aimed to avoid such influence.
Study 1
In the first study we investigate whether NFC is related to the 
projection of personal attitudes on “others”, without further 
specification of this group. We expect that projecting one’s 
attitudes on others may help achieving epistemic security, 
and therefore will be predicted by individuals’ level of NFC. 
Because this group of others is ambiguous with regard to 
in-group our out-group status, this study tests for a ‘generic’ 
NFC effect on social projection. Given that incidental groups 
are rather weak sources of epistemic security, we expect that 
NFC will enhance social projection, but the effect should 
be limited.
Methods
Participants
Two hundred and sixty-one participants (Mage = 35.77 years, 
SDage = 11.17, 37.5% women) completed the full study on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Procedure and measures
Participants completed Roets and Van Hiel’s (2011c) brief 
15-item version of the NFC scale (M = 4.02, SD = .82, Cron-
bach’s α = .88) on 6-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disa-
gree; 6 = strongly agree). A sample item is ‘I don’t like situ-
ations that are uncertain’. Subsequently, participants were 
presented with nine pairs of pictures (3 pairs of landscapes, 
3 pairs of pieces of furniture and 3 pairs of paintings) and 
were asked to indicate which of the two images they like the 
most. We chose to measure social projection using pairs of 
similar and trivial images in order to minimize the role of 
pre-existing group norms or potential preferences driven by 
participants’ NFC. Three examples of the stimuli are pre-
sented in Fig. 1. Finally, participants were presented with 
the same pairs of pictures and were asked, for each pair, to 
estimate the percentage of other participants in this study 
they thought would prefer the same image. Estimates were 
made on sliders ranging from 0 to 100 and averaged into 
a single index of social projection (M = 60.06, SD = 11.32, 
Cronbach’s α = .78). In order to make participants’ personal 
preferences salient, their own personal choice was presented 
along with the question to estimate the percentage (i.e., “You 
preferred image X. What percentage of the participants will 
prefer the same image?”).
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Fig. 1  Examples of stimuli material in Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3
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Results and discussion
Given the use of similar and trivial images, we did not expect 
that dispositional levels of NFC would be significantly 
related to individuals’ preferences of one of the images in 
a pair, and binary logistic regression analyses indeed pro-
vided no evidence for a NFC effect on image preferences, all 
χ2(2) < 3.25, all ps > .071. However, in line with our expecta-
tions, linear regression analysis revealed that NFC signifi-
cantly predicted the tendency to project one’s own prefer-
ences on others (F (1, 259) = 4.34, p = .038, β = .13). Hence, 
the results confirm our hypothesis that higher levels of NFC 
are related to more social projection on ‘other participants’. 
Given that this unspecified group is a rather weak source for 
providing epistemic security, the effect of NFC was rather 
small, as expected.
Study 2
In study 2, we examine the effects of NFC on social projec-
tion in an intergroup context. Because the epistemic value 
of a group depends on the degree to which the collectiv-
ity is important for the individual (Kruglanski et al. 2006), 
we hypothesize that NFC will predict social projection on 
in-group members, but not on out-group members. Addi-
tionally, we examine whether the tendency of individuals’ 
higher (vs. lower) in NFC to project their own attitudes on 
the in-group is mediated by essentialist entitativity beliefs.
Methods
Participants
Two hundred and thirty-nine undergraduate psychology 
students (Mage = 18.91 years, SDage = 3.13, 83.3% women) 
participated in return for partial course credit.
Procedure and measures
The experiment was conducted in the lab in collective 
sessions of about forty students under supervision of two 
research assistants. The procedure of Study 2 was similar 
to that of Study 1, with two extensions. First, in addition 
to NFC (M = 3.59, SD = .62, Cronbach’s α = .79), essential-
ist entitativity beliefs about student groups based on their 
curriculum were measured. This 12-item measure (adapted 
from Roets and Van Hiel 2011b) taps into beliefs about uni-
formity, informativeness, and inherence of students within 
the same curriculum, and was measured on 7-point Likert 
scales (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree; M = 3.26, 
SD = .73, Cronbach’s α = .80). A sample item is ‘Students 
who are enrolled in the same curriculum are usually very 
similar’. Second, after the participants -who were all under-
graduate psychology students- had indicated for each pair 
which image they preferred, they were told that the study 
was conducted with psychology students and with economy 
students. Then, they were asked to estimate for each pair 
the percentage of psychology students (= in-group) they 
thought would prefer the same image as they did (M = 57.05, 
SD = 7.02, Cronbach’s α = .40). Subsequently, participants 
were asked to estimate for each pair of images the percent-
age of the economy students (= out-group) they thought 
would prefer the same image (M = 54.95, SD = 7.38, Cron-
bach’s α = .48).1
Results and discussion
Similar to Study 1, we first examined whether NFC was 
related to individuals’ preferences of one of the images in a 
pair. Binary logistic regression analyses demonstrated that 
only for one pair of images in this sample, NFC was signifi-
cantly related to the preference of one image over the other 
(χ2(1) = 7.10, p = .008). However, all other NFC—personal 
preference associations were non-significant (all χ2(1) < 2.24, 
all ps > .134), providing no evidence for a meaningful asso-
ciation between NFC and personal preferences. Omitting 
this single item from the projection measures did not alter 
the results, therefore, reported analyses are conducted on the 
complete measures.
As reported in Table 1, NFC was significantly positively 
related to in-group projection, but not to out-group projec-
tion. A directional, one-tailed test using Lee and Preacher’s 
(2013) test of the difference between two dependent correla-
tions with one variable in common, confirmed that the signif-
icant correlation between NFC and in-group projection was 
significantly stronger compared to the non-significant cor-
relation between NFC and out-group projection (p = .036). 
Finally, Bootstrap analyses (1000 bootstrap samples) with 
Hayes’ PROCESS macro (2013) revealed that essentialist 
entitativity mediated the relationship between NFC and in-
group projection [direct effect b = 2.07, SE = .73, p = .005; 
indirect effect: b = .43, boot SE = .26,  CI95 (.10; 1.15)].
In line with study 1, these results suggests that people 
high in NFC are more inclined to project their own atti-
tudes onto others, but as predicted, significant NFC effects 
1 For the projection measures in Study 2, internal reliability was sur-
prisingly low, compared to the good to excellent internal reliability 
for the same measure(s) in Study 1, Cronbach’s α = .78, and Study 3, 
Cronbach’s α = .80, and Cronbach’s α = .89. Because identical stim-
uli and procedures were used in all three studies, we are unsure why 
the reliability coefficient of the projection measures in this study was 
considerably lower than in the other studies. In absence of an alterna-
tive explanation, it could be that Belgian students are less consistent 
than US adults in their social projection.
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occurred only for in-group projection and were mediated by 
the endorsement of essentialist entitativity beliefs. Although 
the relationship between NFC and outgroup projection was 
not significant, it can be noted that people high in NFC 
also show a slight tendency to project their attitudes on the 
out-group. A possible explanation for this result is that the 
demarcation between in-group (psychology students) and 
out-group (economy students) was not very strong. After 
all, both groups have the same superordinate identity, i.e. 
students of the same university (who allegedly both par-
ticipated in a particular study). The substantial correlation 
between in-group and out-group projection and the relatively 
low levels of essentialist entitativity beliefs also attest to this 
idea. Moreover, previous research has shown that individuals 
may project in-group characteristics onto the superordinate 
category (Wenzel et al. 2007). This salient superordinate 
identity might also explain the remaining direct relationship 
between NFC and in-group projection, in addition to the 
indirect relationship through essentialist entitativity beliefs.
Study 3
In the third study we aimed to replicate the results from 
Study 2 while also increasing the salience of the differen-
tiation between in- and out-group. Given that the 2016 US 
presidential elections coincided with the planning of our 
third study, we chose to make use of the strong intergroup 
opposition in this election, and we delineated in-group and 
out-group based on participants’ vote in the US presiden-
tial election. Given that the election had taken place a week 
before the moment of data collection, we assumed that this 
categorization would still be very salient in the participants’ 
minds.
Methods
Participants
Two hundred forty-eight participants who participated in 
the 2016 presidential election of the US completed the full 
questionnaire on Turk Prime.2 Participants who did not 
vote for one of the two major candidates for presidency 
(Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton), were omitted (N = 25), 
leading to an effective sample size of 223 participants 
(Mage = 38.79 years, SDage = 11.98, 57.1% women, 58.7% 
voted for Clinton, 41.3% voted for Trump).
Procedure and measures
The procedure and materials of Study 3 were identical to 
those of Study 2, with the exception of the operationaliza-
tion of group identity. In Study 3, group identity was oper-
ationalized on the basis of having voted for a certain presi-
dential candidate. Participants completed the measures of 
NFC (M = 4.11, SD = .81, Cronbach’s α = .89), essential-
ist entitativity beliefs about voters of a given presidential 
candidate (e.g., ‘Voters for a certain presidential candidate 
are usually very similar’, M = 3.80, SD = 1.01, Cronbach’s 
α = .87), in-group projection (M = 54.80, SD = 11.13, 
Cronbach’s α = .80) and out-group projection (M = 44.93, 
SD = 13.71, Cronbach’s α = .89).
Results and discussion
As expected, neither for group membership (all χ2(1) < 2.77, 
all ps > .096) nor for NFC (all χ2(1) < 2.51, all ps > .113) 
evidence of a significant relationship to preference for one 
image over the other in any of the pairs was found. The 
correlation matrix presented in Table 1 again shows that 
NFC is related to in-group projection, and not to out-group 
projection. Similar to Study 2, a directional, one-tailed test 
using Lee and Preacher’s (2013) test of difference between 
two dependent correlations with one variable in common, 
again confirmed that the significant correlation between 
NFC and in-group projection was significantly stronger 
compared to the non-significant correlation between NFC 
and out-group projection (p = .036, identical to Study 2). 
Furthermore, mediation analyses using Hayes’ PROCESS 
macro (2013) demonstrated that essentialist entitativity 
mediates the relationship between NFC and in-group 
Table 1  Bivariate correlations among NFC, essentialist entitativity 
and social projection in Study 2 and Study 3
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 (2-tailed)
NFC Essentialist 
Entitativity
In-group 
Projec-
tion
Study 2
 1. NFC
 2. Essentialist Entitativity .22***
 3. In-group projection .22*** .22***
 4. Out-group projection .11 .15* .54***
Study 3
 1. NFC
 2. Essentialist Entitativity .33***
 3. In-group projection .19** .22***
 4. Out-group projection .04  −.22*** .21**
2 Participants that had already participated in Study 1 were barred 
from participating in Study 3.
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projection [direct effect b = 1.83, SE = .95, p = .054; indi-
rect effect: b = .80, boot SE = .33,  CI95 (.28; 1.62)].
The results of Study 3 replicate those of Study 2 in a dif-
ferent population (adult US citizens vs. undergraduate psy-
chology students from a Belgium university), using a differ-
ent operationalization of group identity (having voted for a 
certain presidential candidate vs. choice of study program). 
This replication hence provides additional support for our 
hypothesis that individuals higher (vs. lower) in NFC project 
their own attitudes on the in-group in order to attain epis-
temic security, and that essentialist entitativity beliefs play a 
mediating role in this effect. As expected, given that politi-
cal voting behavior arguably provides a stronger out-group 
criterion than choice of study program, the effect of NFC on 
out-group projection was lower in this study compared to 
Study 2, and reduced to virtually zero. This is also reflected 
in a considerably lower correlation between in-group projec-
tion and out-group projection.
General discussion
Kruglanski et al. (2006) introduced the syndrome of group-
centrism, referring to an individual’s desire for a shared real-
ity and common worldview with group members. An impor-
tant and frequently studied process to facilitate this goal 
is introjecting group norms. The present series of studies 
aimed to extend our knowledge regarding group-centrism, 
by examining the role of NFC in the projection of one’s 
own norms on the group in situations where clear group 
norms are lacking. This series of studies is the first to show 
that NFC is related to social projection. In the first study, 
we investigated the generic effect of NFC and demonstrated 
that high levels of NFC indeed predicted social projection 
of own preferences onto other participants. Given that it 
was not specified who these others were, they constituted 
an incidental crowd, and hence had some, but limited value 
in terms of epistemic security. In Study 2 and Study 3, we 
tested whether NFC effects on social projection increased as 
a function of the extent to which the collectivity matters for 
the individual. The results from these studies demonstrated 
that NFC effects on social projection were strengthened for 
in-groups, and weakened or disappeared for out-groups.
In the literature, social projection is often described as a 
judgmental heuristic that allows individuals to make quick 
decisions about others (Krueger 2007). Consequently, one 
might argue that the positive association between high 
levels of NFC and social projection are merely the result 
of high NFC individuals’ characteristic tendency to seize 
on the most salient and available information, i.e., one’s 
own attitudes. However, the present studies show that high 
NFC individuals’ tendency for social projection is depend-
ent on the relevance of the group as a potential provider 
of epistemic security. Indeed high NFC individuals’ ten-
dency for social projection is modest for incidental groups, 
heightened for in-groups, and weak or absent for out-groups. 
Therefore, these results support our perspective that indi-
viduals higher (vs. lower) in NFC engage in social projec-
tion not just as a means for quick decision making but also 
as an attempt to construct a shared reality and the epistemic 
security it provides. This perspective is important because 
it may suggests that the resulting assumptions about the 
group norms may be less fleeting than one would expect 
based on the pure heuristics perspective. In particular, when 
high NFC individuals project their own attitudes on groups 
at the initial phase of attitude development, these attitudes 
achieve the subjective status of a shared reality, equivalent 
to actual group norms in their functionality to provide epis-
temic security. Consequently, individuals high in NFC will 
be especially motivated to ‘freeze’ these perceptions and be 
reluctant to change their attitudes, because this would imply 
giving up the desired epistemic security.
Additional mediation analyses showed that essentialist 
entitativity beliefs play a mediating role in the effect of NFC 
on in-group projection. Indeed, previous research by Roets 
and Van Hiel (2011b) has already shown that high NFC 
individuals more strongly endorse and use an essentialized 
perspective on social groups, including their own in-group, 
in order to structure and disambiguate the complexity of 
the social world. Such beliefs about group uniformity and 
communality of inherent traits among group members is 
instrumental and even necessary for projecting their own 
preferences and attitudes onto the in-group. In this regard, it 
is worth noting that the positive effect of NFC and essential-
ism were very similar for in-group projection. However, in 
Study 3 where the contrast between in-group and out-group 
was most pronounced, the effect of NFC on out-group pro-
jection was virtually zero, whereas for essentialism a signifi-
cantly negative effect was found. To explain this difference 
in effect, we should keep in mind that NFC is primarily con-
cerned with the question whether a group is relevant as an 
epistemic provider or not. If the group is relevant, high NFC 
individuals will conform to the group, or project their own 
attitudes if group norms are lacking or unclear (as was the 
case on the present research). However, If the group is con-
sidered irrelevant, NFC may have no meaningful effect on 
projection simply because the group is ignored as potential 
provider of epistemic security. Indeed, the group-centrism 
perspective of Kruglanski et al. (2006) as well as work by 
Roets and Van Hiel (2011a) have emphasized the importance 
of NFC in intragroup processes. Although NFC undeniably 
also influences intergroup processes, and has been shown to 
elicit the need to differentiate the in-group from out-groups 
(see Federico et al. 2013), this aspect seems to be less rel-
evant or influential when it comes to social projection as an 
attempt to construct a shared reality. Essentialist thinking 
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about groups, on the other hand, partly stems from high NFC 
(see Roets and Van Hiel 2011b), but is inherently much more 
concerned with intergroup aspects and delineating groups 
as fundamentally different with exclusive characteristics. 
Therefore, essentialism is a much more direct motivator 
for people to explicitly pit groups against each other and to 
increase contrast as much as possible. This may explain why 
essentialism had a significant negative effect on out-group 
projection in Study 3, where the in-group versus out-group 
demarcation was the clearest.
Conclusion
The present series of studies built on Kruglanski et al.’s 
(2006) theory of NFC and group-centrism, demonstrating 
that in the absence of a shared reality, individuals higher (vs. 
lower) in NFC tend to project their own attitudes onto their 
(in-)group in order to attain such shared reality and hence, 
epistemic security. Additional mediation analyses revealed 
that essentialist entitativity beliefs play a mediating role 
in the effect of NFC on social projection. The tendency to 
project one’s own attitudes onto others is highly relevant in 
social interactions and the present research provides a new 
(additional) perspective on the motivations behind social 
projection in terms of a need for epistemic security.
Acknowledgements Funding was provided by BOF (BOF.
STA.2014.0008.01).
References
Calogero, R. M., Bardi, A., & Sutton, R. M. (2009). A need basis 
for values: Associations between the need for cognitive closure 
and value priorities. Personality and Individual Differences, 46, 
154–159.
Campbell, D. T. (1958). Common fate, similarity, and other indices of 
the status of aggregates of persons as social entities. Behavioral 
Science, 3, 14–25.
De Grada, E., Kruglanski, A. W., Mannetti, L., & Pierro, A. (1999). 
Motivated cognition and group interaction: Need for closure 
affects the contents and processes of collective negotiations. Jour-
nal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 346–365.
Federico, C. M., Hunt, C. V., & Fisher, E. L. (2013). Uncertainty and 
status-based asymmetries in the distinction between the “good” 
us and the “bad” them: Evidence that group status strengthens the 
relationship between the need for cognitive closure and extrem-
ity in intergroup differentiation. Journal of Social Issues, 69, 
473–494.
Festinger, L. (1950). Informal social communication. Psychological 
Review, 57, 271–282.
Fu, J. H. Y., Morris, M. W., Lee, S. L., Chao, M., Chiu, C-y., & Hong, 
Y. Y. (2007). Epistemic motives and cultural conformity: Need 
for closure, culture, and context as determinants of conflict 
judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 
191–207.
Hardin, C. D., & Higgins, E. T. (1996). Shared reality: How social 
verification makes the subjective objective. In R. M. Sorrentino 
& E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of Motivation and Cognition 
(pp. 28–84). New York: Guilford Press.
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to Mediation, Moderation and 
Conditional Process Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach. 
New York: Guilford Press.
Holmes, D. S. (1968). Dimensions of projection. Psychological Bul-
letin, 69, 248–268.
Holtz, R. (2003). Intragroup or intergroup attitude projection can 
increase opinion certainty: Is there classism at college? Journal 
of Applied Social Psychology, 33, 1922–1944.
Krueger, J. (1998). On the perception of social consensus. Advances 
in Experimental Social Psychology, 30, 163–240.
Krueger, J. (2007). From social projection to social behavior. Euro-
pean Review of Social Psychology, 18, 1–35.
Kruglanski, A. W. (1980). Lay epistemologic processes and contents. 
Another look at attribution theory. Psychological Review, 87, 
70–78.
Kruglanski, A. W. (1990). Motivations for judging and knowing: 
Implications for causal attribution. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. 
Sorrentino (Eds.), The Handbook of Motivation and Cogni-
tion: Foundation of Social Behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 333–368). New 
York: Guilford Press.
Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., & De Grada, E. (2006). 
Groups as epistemic providers: Need for closure and the unfold-
ing of group-centrism. Psychological Review, 113, 84–100.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1991). Group members’ reac-
tions to opinion deviates and conformists at varying degrees of 
proximity to decision deadline and environmental noise. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 212–225.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing 
of the mind: “seizing” and “freezing”. Psychological Review, 
103, 263–283.
Lee, I. A., & Preacher, K. J. (2013). Calculation for the test of the 
difference between two dependent correlations with one variable 
in common [Computer software].
Livi, S., Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., & Kenny, D. A. 
(2015). Epistemic motivation and perpetuation of group culture: 
Effects of need for cognitive closure on trans-generational norm 
transmission. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 129, 105–112.
Robbins, J. M., & Krueger, J. I. (2005). Social projection to ingroups 
and outgroups: A review and meta-analysis. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 9, 32–47.
Roets, A. (2017). Three decades of need for closure research: About 
epistemic goals and (not) means. In C. Kopetz & A. Fishbach 
(Eds.), The Motivation-Cognition Interface; From the Lab to 
the Real World. A Festschrift in Honor of Arie W. Kruglanski 
(pp. 39–55). Abingdon: Routledge.
Roets, A., Kruglanski, A. W., Kossowska, M., Pierro, A. & Hong, Y. 
(2015). The motivated gatekeeper of our minds: New directions 
in need for closure. Advances in Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy, 52, 221–283.
Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2007). Separating ability from need: 
Clarifying the dimensional structure of the need for closure 
scale. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 266–280.
Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2011a). Allport’s prejudiced personal-
ity today: Need for closure as the motivated cognitive basis 
of prejudice. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 
349–354.
Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2011b). The role of need for closure 
in essentialist entitativity and prejudice: An epistemic needs 
approach to racial categorization. British Journal of Social Psy-
chology, 50, 52–73.
Motiv Emot 
1 3
Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2011c). Item selection and validation of a 
brief, 15-item version of the Need for Closure scale. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 50, 90–94.
Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The false consensus effect: 
An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 279–301.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judg-
ing frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207–232.
Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences 
in need for cognitive closure. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 67, 1049–1062.
Wenzel, M., Mummendey, A., & Waldzus, S. (2007). Superordinate 
identities and intergroup conflict: The ingroup projection model. 
European Review of Social Psychology, 18, 331–372.
